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I COMMENTS I
The Aftermath of General Motors and
Georgine: Are Settlement Classes
Doomed?
1. Introduction
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 231 authorizes class action
1. In relevant part, Rule 23 provides:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Action Maintainable. An action may be a maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the
prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive
of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substan-
tially impair or impede their ability to protect their interest; or (2) the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or (3) the court finds that
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
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suits. A litigation class must meet the certification requirements
contained in Rule 23. Courts have also developed the concept of
a settlement class, 2 which is designed for case resolution, not
litigation.3  Settlement classes, like litigation classes, require
judicial approval, although a less rigorous standard for settlement
class certification is customarily applied.4
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the contro-
versy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to Be Maintained;
Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions. (1) As soon as
practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the
court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under
this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the
decision on the merits .....
(d) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner
as the court directs.
FED R. CIv. P. 23.
2. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir. 1989); Mars Steel Corp. v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust, 834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Dennis
Greenman Sec. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1987); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d
61, 72 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1979).
See also Note, Back to the Drawing Board: The Settlement Class Action and the Limits of
Rule 23, 109 HARV. L. REV. 828 (1996) [hereinafter Drawing Board]. The validity of
settlement classes has been debated in academia and in the courts. There is no clear author-
ity for settlement class certification in Rule 23, but all courts that have considered this issue
have concluded that settlement classes are permissible under Rule 23. See, e.g., Mars Steel,
834 F.2d at 681 (concluding that "every court that has addressed this question, including our
own, has declined to hold that the procedure is a per se violation of Rule 23 .... ).
3. See Roger C. Cranton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class
Actions": An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 823 (1995) (arguing that there is a
"settlement class action" that is "designed to be settled rather than be litigated."). It is true
that some class actions are designed to be settled. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83
F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997). In this case, class action and settlement
were filed on the same day. Of course, some suits are settled after the action is certified as
a litigation class. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.
1981); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Fisher
Bros. v. Mueller Brass Co., 630 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Pa. 1985). Others are settled after a
litigation class has been invalidated on appellate review. See Factor Concentrate Litig.
Settlement Agreement, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). (the
unpublished settlement is on file with the author).
4. See White v. National Football League 41 F.3d 402, 408 (8th Cir. 1994); A.H. Robins
Co., 880 F.2d at 740; Greenman Sec. Litig., 829 F.2d at 1543; Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d
893, 900 (2d Cir. 1985); Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d at 195.
ARE SETTrLEMENT CLASSES DOOMED?
Until recently, application of a relaxed standard for settlement
class certification was generally accepted.' Often, the primary
factor considered was the existence and fairness of the proposed
settlement.6  Two recent appellate decisions, however, have
threatened the settlement class concept, injecting uncertainty into
a previously settled area of jurisprudence. On April 17, 1995, the
Third Circuit decided In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Products Liability Litigation,7 stunning corporate
America and the litigation bar. The Third Circuit, despite decades
of decisions to the contrary, declared that it is not permissible to
relax Rule 23 requirements when determining whether to certify a
settlement class.8 Until General Motors, adversaries frequently
used settlement classes as an efficient way in which to resolve
complex multi-party disputes.
On May 10, 1996, reviewing another settlement class certifica-
tion, the Third Circuit rejected a long awaited but controversial
settlement in a massive asbestos case, Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc.9  In Georgine, the court further extended the
principle announced in General Motors, ruling that it is impermiss-
ible to consider the existence of a settlement when deciding
whether to certify a settlement class, and again requiring strict
application of each Rule 23 requirement as if a litigation class were
being considered.1" In determining that Georgine could not be
properly certified as a litigation class,11 the court overturned a
settlement that was years in the making.
The General Motors and Georgine decisions have not enjoyed
a favorable judicial response. Shortly after Georgine, the Fifth
Circuit squarely rejected the Third Circuit's position in In' re
Asbestos Litigation ("Fibreboard").2  In Fibreboard, the Fifth
Circuit reaffirmed a relaxed standard for settlement class certifica-
tion, holding that courts should consider a proposed settlement
5. See White, 41 F.3d at 408; A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 740; Greenman Sec. Litig.,
829 F.2d at 1543; Malchman, 761 F.2d at 900; Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d
at 195.
6. See, e.g., Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 681; Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 69-73; Beef Indus.
Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d at 177.
7. 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
8. See id. at 796.
9. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
10. See id. at 625-26.
11. See id.
12. 90 F.3d 963, 975-76 (5th Cir. 1996).
1998]
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when deciding whether Rule 23 requirements are satisfied.13 As
a result, there is a conflict between the Third Circuit and the other
circuits that have considered this issue."
The Third Circuit's rulings could potentially impact millions of
people and businesses, because it could foreclose settlements in
many complex federal class actions. It is becoming increasingly
difficult to achieve certification of litigation classes," and it is
problematic for traditional settlement classes to meet the Third
Circuit's rigid reading of Rule 23.16 Defendants may want to
settle litigation, but will not want to concede that a litigation class
would be appropriate.17 In addition, the Third Circuit's ruling
ignores important policy considerations favoring settlement. For
example, some class action settlements permit recovery for claims
that might technically be barred by statutes of limitation.18 Under
the Third Circuit's application of Rule 23, such claims would be
barred from participation in a settlement class.
13. See id.
14. The following are examples of cases in which the court used an approach akin to
Fibreboard: In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir. 1989); Mars Steel Corp. v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 680-81 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Dennis
Greenman Sec. Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1987); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d
61, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1982); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 668 F.2d 615, 633 (9th
Cir. 1982); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 173-78 (5th Cir. 1979).
15. See Barry McNeil & Beth Fancsali, Mass Torts and Class Actions: Facing Increased
Scrutiny, 167 F.R.D. 483, 511-12 (1996). One of the primary arguments against certification
of a multi-state litigation class is that state laws may vary and allegedly it would be unfair
to subject the defendant to a single legal standard. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,
84 F.3d 734, 742-43 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1301-02
(7th Cir. 1995).
16. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 610 (3d Cir. 1996), affd 117 S.
Ct. 2231 (1997); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995). These are the two settlement classes reviewed by the Third Circuit
using the new standard, both of which have been decertified.
17. See United States Circuit Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Remarks to Institute for Law and
Economic Policy at the University of Arizona (Dec. 14, 1996) (arguing that defendants need
to settle class actions because it is the only economic alternative to a litigation class)
(transcript available from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
18. See Factor Concentrate Litig. Settlement Agreement, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). (the unpublished settlement is on file with the author).
This same argument can be used against class action settlements. Claims that are not barred
by the statute of limitations may be devalued by allowing recovery for claims that are time
barred. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rule
Meets the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1174-77 (1995) (discussing problems when a class
is large and class members have competing interests).
1998] ARE SETTLEMENT CLASSES DOOMED?
As a result of the conflict between the circuits, it was predicted
that the Supreme Court would review Georgine,19 and on Novem-
ber 1, 1996, the petition for certiorari was granted."° Additionally,
in another effort to resolve the conflict, an amendment to Rule 23
has been proposed that would allow courts to consider settlements
when making class certification decisions.21 This amendment was
19. See McNeil & Fancsali, supra note 15, at 516.
20. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996). The Supreme Court
did not specify as to which issue certiorari was granted. See id.
21. The proposed amendment is as follows (new material is underlined, superseded
material is struck out):
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:* * * * (3) the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(a) the practical ability of class members to pursue their claim without class
certification;
(-AB) the interzst of fembzrs of the cla~s in r.adi dual'y eantrlling the
pr...tiizn er defense cf class members' interests in maintaining or defending
separate actions;
(4C) the extent, nd nature, and maturity of any related litigation erfeeFg the
ecntre~vry al .rady eazamzns by .r agai.st involving class members ofthe-eas,
(GD) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum;
(GE) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action;
and
(F) whether the probable relief to individual class members justifies the costs and
burdens of class litigation; or
(4) the parties to a settlement request certification under subdivision (b)(3) for
purposes of settlement, even though the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not
be met for purposes of trial.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action To Be Maintained; Notice;
Judgement; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As seen as When practicable after the commencement of an action brought as
a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.
An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or
amended before the decision on the merits.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compro-
mised without Hearing and the approval of the court, e4 after notice of the
proposed dismissal or compromise sha4 -be has been given to all members of the
class in such manner as the court directs.
(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an
order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under this rule
if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of
appeals so orders.
FED R. CIV. P. 23 (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment 1996).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
recently forwarded by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee to the
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.22
This comment considers whether courts should apply a relaxed
standard when considering settlement class certification under Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Part II summarizes
recent judicial decisions concerning settlement classes. Part III
examines the current state of the law with respect to settlement
classes. Part IV concludes that the existence of a proposed
settlement should be considered when deciding whether to certify
a settlement class, and the Third Circuit's rigid application of Rule
23 should be rejected.
II. Background: The Third Circuit Fires First
The debate as to whether a court may consider the existence
of a settlement when deciding whether to certify a settlement class
began in General Motors when the Court vacated an order
certifying a settlement class and approving a proposed settle-
23ment. The settlement had been intended to resolve claims
concerning General Motors' pick-up trucks that were allegedly
prone to fuel tank fires resulting from side collisions.24 The
settlement as approved by the district court allowed each class
member to receive a one thousand dollar certificate redeemable
towards the purchase of a new GMC truck or Chevrolet light duty
truck.25 The district court had provisionally certified the class for
settlement purposes only, but did not make specific findings
regarding the requirements of Rule 23(a) or (b). 26  Notice was
mailed to nearly 5.7 million truck owners and published in USA
Today and The Philadelphia Inquirer.27  The district court con-
ducted a fairness hearing, allowing objectors to submit briefs and
to be heard.2' The district court, applying existing law in the
Third Circuit, then confirmed the provisional settlement class
22. See id.
23. See In Re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 822 (3d Cir. 1995).
24. See id. at 779-80.
25. See id. at 780 (offering a simplified description of the settlement).
26. See id. at 781.
27. See id.
28. See General Motors, 55 F.3d at 781.
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certification and approved the settlement as fair, reasonable, and
adequate.2 9
The settlement approval was challenged by objectors who
sought appellate review, and the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Becker, reversed.3 ° Judge Becker
examined whether settlement classes are permissible under Rule 23
and concluded that such classes are cognizable, but only if the class
could have been certified as a litigation class.31 Judge Becker
discussed whether Rule 23(a) findings are required for settlement
class certification, observing that "[t]here is no explicit requirement
in Rule 23 that the district judge make a formal finding that the
requisites of the rule have been met in order to certify a class."32
He nonetheless concluded that henceforth formal findings under
Rule 23(a) must be made "because the legitimacy of settlement
classes depends upon fidelity to the fundamentals of Rule 23.
33
Judge Becker was concerned that unless the requisite Rule 23(a)
findings were made, a reviewing court could not independently
determine whether the settlement was fair.34  The court then
applied this requirement retroactively, holding that because the
district court had not made specific Rule 23(a) findings, the case
must be remanded to determine whether class certification could be
sustained under this newly announced standard.35 Judge Becker
expressed concern that class certification for settlement purposes
both contravened the requirements of Rule 23(c)(1) 36 and de-
prived the judiciary of information needed to make an informed
class certification decision under Rule 23(e).37
Judge Becker also considered whether a settlement class that
would not meet the requirements for a litigation class could be
certified.3' He concluded that while other courts have applied a
lower standard for settlement class certification, in the Third Circuit
29. See id. at 781-82.
30. See id. at 777-78.
31. See id. at 786-98. Since the General Motors decision, at least one author has
concluded that Judge Becker was incorrect in deciding that settlement classes are permissible
under Rule 23. See Drawing Board, supra note 2, at 828.
32. General Motors, 55 F.3d at 794.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 799.
35. See id. at 778-79.
36. See id. at 787.
37. See General Motors, 55 F.3d at 789.
38. See id. at 797-800.
19981
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henceforth there could be no settlement class unless the require-
ments of numerosity, typicality, commonality, and adequacy of
representation were met.39
In Georgine, an opinion also authored by Judge Becker, the
Third Circuit vacated an order approving a settlement class in a
major asbestos personal injury case.4 In Georgine, the court held
that applying a lessor Rule 23 standard when certifying a settlement
class was impermissible." The court recognized that asbestos
litigation is over-burdening court dockets: "[I]ssues are litigated
over and over; transaction costs exceed the victims' recovery by
nearly two to one; exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the
process; and future claimants may lose altogether. 4 2  The pro-
posed $1.3 billion national settlement would have resolved present
and future claims of class members for asbestos related injury or
wrongful death against all defendants.43 After a massive notice
campaign and an eighteen day fairness hearing,' the district court
certified the settlement class under Rule 23 and concluded that the
settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate.45
Objectors to the settlement appealed.' On appeal, the Third
Circuit rejected yet another settlement class.47  The court's
analysis began with the propriety of the settlement class certifica-
tion.' Judge Becker wrote that "[t]o obtain class certification,
plaintiff must satisfy all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and
come within one provision of Rule 23(b)."4 9 Judge Becker noted
that the plaintiffs had sought a settlement class pursuant to Rule
39. See id. at 796-800. In a related class action, the Texas Supreme Court reached a
similar conclusion. See General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 954 (Tex. 1996).
Judge Becker also suggested that settlement approval and formal Rule 23 certification
requirements are separate and distinct. General Motors, 55 F.3d at 796.
40. See Georgine v. Amchem Prod., Inc. 83 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996).
41. See id. at 617-18.
42. Id. at 619. (quoting In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415,
418-19 (J.P.M.L. 1991)). This Committee was appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist to
attempt to resolve asbestos litigation problems. The consolidated class action and the
resulting settlement arguably are a result of the Committee's recommendation. See Georgine
v. Amchem Prods., Inc. 157 F.R.D. 246, 265 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
43. See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 620.
44. See id. at 621.
45. See id. at 622.
46. See id. at 621.
47. See id. at 634.
48. See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 624.
49. Id.
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23(b)(3), which requires findings of predominance and superior-
ity.5" The parties in Georgine claimed that the existence of a
settlement could be considered when determining whether the
requirements of predominance and superiority were met.5' Judge
Becker disagreed, concluding that the settlement class failed to
meet either the typicality and adequacy of representation require-
ments of Rule 23(a) or the predominance and superiority require-
ments of Rule 23(b). 2 The court vacated the order approving the
settlement although it described the settlement as "arguably a
brilliant partial solution to the scourge of asbestos that has
heretofore defied global management in any venue."53
The Third Circuit's position is contrary to that of seven other
circuits,54 and while some academics hail the Third Circuit's
position as an important step forward,55 the Fifth Circuit disagree.
On July 26, 1996, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Fibre-
board.56 In an opinion by Judge Davis, the court affirmed
approval of a $1.535 billion global class action settlement for
asbestos-related injuries.5 Judge Davis listed the four require-
ments of Rule 23(a) and noted that the district court had found
that each prerequisite had been satisfied. 58  The Fifth Circuit
considered and rejected the Third Circuit's contrary analysis and
determined that a court may consider the existence of a settlement
in making a class certification decisions under Rule 23."
The following portion of this comment examines the differ-
ences between the circuits and considers whether it should be
permissible under Rule 23 to apply a lessor standard when
considering certification of a settlement class.
50. See id. at 625.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 634.
53. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 617.
54. See In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 975 (5th Cir. 1996); White v. National Football
League, 41 F.3d 402, 408 (8th Cir. 1994); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir.
1989); Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 834 F.2d 677, 680-81 (7th
Cir. 1987); In re Dennis Greenman Sec. Litig, 829 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1987);
Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 900 (2d Cir. 1985); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615, 633 (9th Cir. 1982).
55. See, e.g., Cranton, supra note 3, at 825-27.
56. In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996).
57. See id. at 993.
58. See id. at 974-75.




A. The Ill-Fated Settlement Class in the Third Circuit
According to the Third Circuit, settlement classes are cogniz-
able under Rule 23, but it is impermissible to: (i) apply a lower
standard to a settlement class than a litigation class; (ii) consider
the existence of a settlement as inferentially satisfying Rule 23(a)
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
of representation; or (iii) consider the existence of a settlement as
inferentially satisfying Rule 23 (b)(3) requirements of predominance
and superiority.6"
In General Motors, the court focused much of its discussion on
adequacy of representation, but noted that "presence of commonal-
ity and typicality" are equally important.61 The court insisted that
"strict application" of Rule 23(a) be followed because "Rule 23 is
designed to assure that courts will identify the common interests of
class members and evaluate the named plaintiff's and counsel's
ability to fairly and adequately protect class interests., 62  The
court was particularly concerned about settlement classes "[b]e-
cause the issue of certification is never actively contested, the judge
never receives the benefit of the adversarial process that provides
the information needed to review propriety of the class and the
adequacy of settlement., 63 In order to prevent collusion, the court
concluded that courts must be "even more scrupulous than usual in
approving settlements where no [litigation] class has yet been
formally certified. ' The court referred to this as a "heightened
standard.
65
The holding of General Motors was expanded in Georgine to
include the Rule 23(b)(3) requirements of predominance and super-
60. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 624-25 (3d Cir. 1996), affd 117
S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
61. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 799 (3d Cir. 1995).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 789. In General Motors, Judge Becker forewarned of the impending doom of
the Georgine settlement, noting that "[t]his problem is exacerbated where the parties agree
on a settlement of the class before the class action is filed . I..." d. This is exactly what
happened in Georgine where the class action complaint and the proposed settlement were
filed on the same day. See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 620 (3d Cir. 1996).
64. General Motors, 55 F.3d at 805.
65. Id.
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iority.6 The court held that "[t]he 23(b)(3) requirements protect
the same interests in fairness and efficiency as the 23(a) require-
ments, 67 and concluded that courts may not consider the existence
of settlement when making Rule 23(b)(3) findings.
68
The court explained that "[w]hile the better policy may be to
alter the class certification inquiry to take settlement into account,
the current Rule 23 does not permit such an exception., 69 Thus,
although it appears that the Third Circuit favored consideration of
the existence of a settlement when making findings under Rule 23,
it declined to do so because Rule 23 does not specifically authorize
consideration of the existence of a settlement.70
B. No Other Circuit Agrees With the Third Circuit
The Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits each consider the existence of a proposed
settlement when evaluating the requirements of Rule 23.71 Most
courts, however, have not extensively analyzed this issue,
72
although the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have discussed settlement
class certification at greater length than the other circuits.73
In 1982, the Fourth Circuit concluded that "[i]f not a ground
for certification per se, certainly settlement should be a factor, and
an important factor, to be considered when determining certifica-
tion."74 According to the Fourth Circuit, courts should give Rule
23 a liberal construction, and adopt a standard of flexibility in
application that in the particular case serves the ends of justice
and promote judicial efficiency.75
The Fifth Circuit had an opportunity in Fibreboard to
reconsider, in light of General Motors and Georgine, whether a
66. See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 625.
67. Id. at 625.
68. See id. at 625 n.10.
69. Id. at 618.
70. See id.
71. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
72. Presumably most courts have not considered this issue because the propriety of
settlement class certification was rarely challenged before the Third Circuit decided General
Motors and Georgine. Indeed, it was raised by the court sua sponte in General Motors. See
In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d
Cir. 1995).
73. See In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F.3d 963, 974-77 (5th Cir. 1996); In re A. H. Robins
Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740-45 (4th Cir. 1989).




court may take the existence of a settlement into account when
making class certification findings. In Fibreboard, the appellants
argued* that "[t]he district court erred by relying upon the existence
and fairness of the proposed settlement to satisfy the criteria of
Rule 23(a). 76 This argument stemmed directly from the Third
Circuit's holding in General Motors.7 7 The Fifth Circuit, however,
was not persuaded by the reasoning in General Motors, and instead
affirmed its prior holdings.78 The Fibreboard court concluded that
it was sensible for a court to consider a proposed settlement, if one
is before it, when deciding certification issues makes good sense.79
The court explained that "[s]ettlements and the events leading
up to them add a great deal of information to the court's inquiry
and will often expose diverging interests or common issues that
were not evident or clear from the complaint. 8 °  The court
observed that "[o]nly the Third Circuit has refused to look at
settlements before it when deciding class certification issues and
even that court admits that taking settlement into account may be
'the better policy."'
81
C Disagreement at the State Level
In addition to judicial criticism at the federal level, the Third
Circuit's position has likewise received an unfavorable response at
the state level. Since Fibreboard, the California Court of Appeals,
Fourth Appellate District, decided Dunk v. Geer82 concerning
settlement class certification. Dunk was a class action against Ford
Motor Company alleging defects in Mustang convertibles. 83 The
trial court had approved a settlement on behalf of a national
76. In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 975 (5th Cir. 1996).
77. See id. The court stated that "[t]his argument ... would require a court to ignore
important and relevant information that sits squarely in front of it when deciding whether
to certify a settlement class." Id.
78. Id. at 975.
79. See id.
80. Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d at 975.
81. Id. (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996), affid
117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997)).
82. 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). After Dunk, the Ninth Circuit decided
Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996). In Valentino, the Ninth
Circuit noted the General Motors decision and added that "[i]t is to be hoped that the
debate ... will add to our understanding of the appropriate role of class litigation in tort
litigation." Id. at 1233.
83. See Dunk, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486.
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class,' and notice was sent to class members and published in
USA Today.85 Objectors appealed. The California appellate court
looked to the federal standard in the Ninth Circuit86 that a
proposed settlement must be "fair, adequate and reasonable."87
It concluded that any relevant factors could be considered when
evaluating whether a settlement is fair.8 The court acknowledged
counsel's concern with noted potential statute of limitation
problems with portions of the claims and concluded that overall,
the settlement was fair.89 The Dunk court also considered the
Third Circuit's view of settlement class certification and expressed
concern "about the approach taken in General Motors."9 Indeed,
the court questioned whether the General Motors court had abused
appellate discretion.91
84. See id. at 487.
85. See id.
86. See Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992) in which
the Ninth Circuit observed that Rule 23 is silent concerning the standards for certification
of a settlement class, but stated that the "universally applied standard is whether the
settlement is fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable." Id. (quoting Officers for Justice
v. San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982)). The Ninth Circuit argued that "[o]ur
task is a very limited one. 'The initial decision to approve or reject a settlement proposal
is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.' We are not permitted to 'substitute
our notions of fairness for those of the district judge and the parties to the agreement."' Id.
(quoting Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 626). The Ninth Circuit found this to be particularly
true with complex class actions. See id.
87. See Dunk, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 487 (citing Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 625).
88. See id. at 488.
89. See id. at 489.
90. Id.
91. See id. The Dunk court noted that the standard of appellate review for settlement
classes is abuse of discretion. See id. (citing Officers, 688 F.2d at 626.). In Dunk, the court
found it "particularly troubling" that the General Motors court relied on isolated portions of
the expert testimony and then "apparently substituted its own 'concern' about the value of
the settlement for that of the district court. Id. at 489. (quoting In re General Motors Corp.
Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 807-10 (3d Cir. 1995)). The Dunk
court opined that in General Motors, the Third Circuit reweighed the evidence and reviewed
the settlement class de novo, rather than under the abuse of discretion standard. See id. In
Dunk, the court was correct in observing that the standard of review for settlement class
certification in the Third Circuit is abuse of discretion. In General Motors, the court stated
that the appellate court will reverse only when "[the] district court's decision rests upon
clearly erroneous findings of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of
law to fact." General Motors, 55 F.3d at 783 (quoting International Union, UAW v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 1987)).
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D. Flaws in the Third Circuit's View of Settlement Classes
The Third Circuit's position is internally inconsistent. The
court defined a settlement class as a "device whereby the court
postpones the formal certification procedure until the parties have
successfully negotiated a settlement, thus allowing a defendant to
explore settlement without conceding any of its arguments against
certification."9 2 Under the court's analysis, settlement classes that
are "provisional" or "conditional" find "at least a colorable basis"
in Rule 23.9' The Third Circuit's conclusion that it is impermiss-
ible to certify a settlement class that could not be certified as a
litigation class is inconsistent with its own definition of a settlement
class.94 It is an oxymoron to argue that a settlement class allows
a defendant to defer opposition to litigation class certification, but
that a settlement class is only permissible if certifiable as a
litigation class. Indeed, the Third Circuit recognized that defend-
ants agree to settlement classes to avoid the risk of having a
litigation class certified.95 However, no defendant will pursue such
a settlement class because in so doing, it will be required to
concede that a de facto litigation class would be appropriate. This
is a Hobson's choice. Under the Third Circuit's reasoning, once a
settlement class is authorized, the certification is not "provisional";
it is the equivalent of a litigation class. Therefore, if the settlement
were to fail, the class, in effect, remains certified and defendants
will consider such certification to be prejudicial.96
In General Motors, the court explained that "[t]here is no
explicit requirement in Rule 23 that the district judge make a
formal finding that the requisites of the rule have been met in
order to certify a class." 97 However, it nonetheless concluded that
formal findings under Rule 23 must be made "because the
legitimacy of settlement classes depends upon fidelity to the
fundamentals of Rule 23. ",98 The court supported its conclusion
92. General Motors, 55 F.3d at 786.
93. Id. at 792.
94. See id. at 798-99.
95. See id. at 790.
96. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) and In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995), which both hold that once
a litigation class is established, plaintiffs can force a settlement because the defense cannot
risk a trial.
97. General Motors, 55 F.3d at 794.
98. Id.
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by explaining "the need for courts to be even more scrupulous than
usual in approving settlements" 99 and that there must be a
"heightened standard" applied to settlement classes tht have not
yet been certified as litigation classes.' 0 However, no heightened
standard for settlement classes can be found in the language of
Rule 23.1°1 The court violated a requirement that Rule 23 be
applied exactly as written and then inconsistently articulated its
own rule by demanding findings about settlement classes that the
rule itself does not require. In effect, the court mandates strict
adherence to the language of Rule 23 as written but then judicially
rewrites Rule 23.
The court's position in General Motors is also contrary to
Third Circuit precedent. In Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane
Co.,102 the court authorized a settlement class that had not been
certified as a litigation class.103 Noting that the district court had
focused the adequacy of representation analysis on the "course of
conduct in negotiating the settlement,"' ' 4 the court concluded that
"the terms of the settlement were considered fair by almost all
those interested, including the [district] court."10 5  In reviewing
the fairness of the settlement, the court concluded that "great
weight" should be accorded to the trial court's views because the
trial court "is exposed to the litigants, and their strategies, positions
and proofs."1" The court did not consider whether the settle-
ment class could have met the requirements for litigation class
certification.
Since Ace Heating, the Third Circuit has twice ruled that there
"is no impediment to determining class actions for the purpose of
99. Id. at 805.
100. See id.
101. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. While no heightened standard exists in
Rule 23, some courts have argued that settlements need to be carefully scrutinized to guard
against improprieties. See, e.g., Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
834 F.2d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 1987); Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982).
102. 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971). In General Motors, Judge Becker noted that in Ace
Heating, the court "did not recognize a need to make the determinations demonstrate a
heightened concern for fairness and a more cautious approach to settlement approval."
General Motors, 55 F.3d at 795.
103. See Ace Heating, 453 F.2d at 33-34.
104. Id. at 34.
105. Id. at 33-34.
106. Id. at 43. This is the standard that the Dunk court believed Judge Becker may have
abused. Dunk v. Geer, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483, 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The Dunk court
suggested that Judge Becker substituted his own opinion for that of the trial court. See id.
19981
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settlement only,"' 07 and in an opinion in a case directly relating
to Georgine, the Third Circuit held that Ace Heating was control-
ling. 1°8 Additionally, the Third Circuit previously noted that Rule
23 is designed to be flexible. 9
Although the Third Circuit acknowledges the traditional
concept that "[t]he law favors settlement, particularly in class
actions and other complex cases where substantial judicial resources
can be conserved by avoiding formal litigation,""' its reading of
Rule 23 chills classwide settlements because, as noted above, a
defendant cannot pursue a settlement class certification without
effectively conceding the appropriateness of a litigation class. This
is exactly what a settlement class was intended to avoid. The Third
Circuit's ruling also encourages forum shopping because litigants
will not risk review of a settlement class in the Third Circuit."'
In assessing the appropriateness of settlement class certifica-
tion, the Third Circuit also appears to ignore that there is nothing
107. Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 155 n.3 (3d Cir. 1975); Greenfield v. Villager Indus.,
Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973). In Girsh, the court argued:
The decision of whether to approve a proposed settlement of a class is left to the
sound discretion of the district court. Some of the factors which are relevant to a
determination of the fairness of a settlement were listed by the Second Circuit in
City of Detroit v. Grinell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974), as follows: (1) the
complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation ... ; (2) the reaction of
the class to the settlement... ; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount
of discovery completed ... ; (4) the risks of establishing liability ... ; (5) the risks
of establishing damages . . . ; (6) the risks of mainlining the class action through
trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgement; (8) the
range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible
recovery ... ; (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible
recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation.
Girsh, 521 F.2d at 156-57.
108. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc. 5 F.3d 707, 714 (3d Cir. 1993). Carlough was
the same underlying consolidated class action in the district court that led to the appeal in
Georgine. In Carlough the court decided whether an order denying certain class members
the right to intervene under Rule 24(a) and 24(b) was interlocutory. It dismissed the appeal,
holding that the order was interlocutory because class members could appeal the final order.
See id. The Third Circuit cited Ace Heating as controlling on the issue. See id. The court
found that Ace Heating was "particularly appropriate in the context of a nationwide consoli-
dation of mass tort litigation." Id.
109. See Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 550 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1977).
110. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995).
111. See White v. General Motors Corp., 18th J.D.C. 42,865 "D" (1996). The unpublished
settlement is on file with author. This is a new settlement of the litigation based on the
original General Motors settlement that was rejected by the Third Circuit but approved by
a Louisiana state court on December 19, 1996.
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in Rule 23 that requires a court to eschew information obtained at
a fairness hearing and in proceedings surrounding a settlement. 2
All other circuits allow the fact of settlement and the proceedings
surrounding it to be considered when determining whether to
certify a settlement class. The lurking concern behind the Third
Circuit's decision is that courts must be concerned about collusion
between defense and plaintiffs' counsel."' But to guard against
such impropriety, a judge conducts a fairness hearing and can
appoint independent experts to evaluate the fairness of the
settlement and the conduct of the lawyers.114 Under the Third
Circuit's interpretation of Rule 23, however, all such information
is irrelevant.
E. The Supreme Court Attempts to Resolve the Conflict
On February 18, 1997, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third
Circuit's decisions in Georgine.15 The Court, however, stated
that "the Third Circuit's opinion bears modification" because
"settlement is relevant to a class certification."'1 6  The Court
affirmed the decision, finding that despite the Third Circuit's
holding that settlements cannot be taken into consideration, the
Third Circuit "did not ignore the settlement ... instead that court
homed in on settlement terms .... 117 Moreover, the Court
found that when "[c]onfronted with a request for settlement-only
class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the
case, if tried, would present intractable management prob-
lems ... for the proposal is that there be no trial." '  The Court,
in effect, affirmed the decision, but made it clear that the critical
legal conclusion drawn by the Third Circuit was erroneous-that it
is impermissible to consider the existence of a settlement when
deciding whether to certify a settlement class. (See pg. 3) How-
ever, the Court did agree with the Third Circuit that fairness of the
112. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The leading treatise on class actions recommends that the
events leading up to a settlement and the settlement itself should be considered when
determining whether to certify a settlement class. See 2 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA
CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11.28, at 11-58 (3d ed. 1992).
113. See General Motors, 55 F.3d at 805.
114. See In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 974 (5th Cir. 1996).
115. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2252 (1997).





settlement is not a substitute for examining requirements of Rule
23(a) and (b). 9
Two days after the Supreme Court decided Georgine, it
vacated the Fifth Circuit's decision in Fibreboard and remanded the
case for reconsideration in light of the Court's holding in Georg-
ine1 2 On remand, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its decision, holding
that "we can find nothing in the [Georgine] opinion that changes
our prior decision. 1 21 The Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior deci-
sion because the Court's holding in Georgine allowed settlements
to be considered when deciding whether certification of a settle-
ment class was proper. Since this approach was employed by the
Fifth Circuit for many years, nothing in Georgine caused the Fifth
Circuit to change its prior holding.
F Should Rule 23 Be Amended in Light of the Court's Holding
in Georgine
A proposal to amend Rule 23 has been forwarded by the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee to the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure.122  The proposed draft contains a new
subdivision numbered (b)(4). According to the Standing Commit-
tee, if adopted, (b)(4) will permit "certification of a class under
(b)(3) for settlement purposes, even though the same class might
not be certified for trial., 123 Citing the Third Circuit's opinions
in General Motors and Georgine, the Standing Committee noted
that most courts have already adopted this practice, but "[s]ome
very recent decisions ... have stated that a class cannot be certified
for settlement purposes unless the same class would be certified for
trial purposes .... ,,124 The Standing Committee concluded that
"[t]his amendment is designed to resolve this newly apparent
disagreement." '125
The new subdivision, (b)(4), however, may not be necessary in
light of the Supreme Court's holding in Georgine. In holding that
119. See id. at 2248-49.
120. See Flanagan and Middleton v. Ahearn v. Fibreboard, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
121. In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668, 669 (5th Cir. 1998).
122. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment 1996).
123. Judicial Conference of United States, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Civil
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settlements can be considered when determining if the require-
ments of Rule 23 have been met, the Court, in effect, found that
there may be a settlement class that does not qualify as a litigation
class.16 This holding lessens any need to amend Rule 23.
There is also a practical reason why not to tamper with the
existing language of the Rule, as expressed by the former Federal
Judicial Center Director and Senior Federal District Judge William
W. Schwarzer. 127 Judge Schwarzer, noting that it has taken thirty
years to judicially interpret the current Rule 23,128 believes that
a revision to Rule 23 "could result in opening Pandora's Box,




There is a long history supporting consideration of a proposed
settlement when making settlement class certification decisions
under Rule 23.13' The Third Circuit's decisions in General Motors
and Georgine, however, called into question the viability of that
history.
The Third Circuit stood alone in ruling that a settlement may
not be considered when making Rule 23 findings. Since the Third
Circuit's opinions in General Motors and Georgine, the Fifth Circuit
had the opportunity to reconsider its approach to settlement class
certification, but declined to do so. 3' The Fifth Circuit refused
to follow the Third Circuit because of precedent, public policy, and
fundamental common sense. The interpretation and application of
Rule 23 has evolved during the years since the current Rule was
adopted in 1966. Precedent, public policy, and common sense favor
126. See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2248 (1997).
127. See William W. Schwarzer, Structuring Multiclaim Litigation: Should Rule 23 be
Revised?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1250 (1996).
128. See id. at 1251-55.
129. Id. at 1250. Professor John C. Coffee argues that since the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Georgine it would be "premature for the advisory committee to take any
position on settlement class actions, pending the Court's decision ...." Letter from John
C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University, to Peter G. McCabe,
Esq., Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States (Nov. 6, 1996) (on file with author).
130. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
131. In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996).
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the interpretation of Rule 23 embraced by the Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.132
In Georgine, the Supreme Court essentially affirmed the
wisdom of these courts, reiterating that a court can consider the
existence of a settlement when making Rule 23 findings. The
Court refused to adopt the position of the Third Circuit, holding
instead that the existence of settlement should be considered when
making findings under Rule 23. This holding has narrowed the
need to amend Rule 23. Consequently, before the Standing
Committee recommends amendments to Rule 23, it should
seriously look at the advantages of the current Rule. If the
Committee proposes to amend Rule 23, this could lead to an
opening of "Pandora's BOX,' ' 133 and it may take another thirty
years for the judiciary to resolve new and inevitably differing views
about how Rule 23 is to be applied.
Daniel N. Gallucci
132. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
133. See Schwarzer, supra note 126, at 1261.
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